Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

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R 131023Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9359 INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

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EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: MNUC, PARM, TECH, IR

SUBJ: DISCUSSIONS WITH GOI ON NON-PROLIFERATION

- 1. AT LUNCHEON MEETING BETWEEN AEOI PRESDENT ETEMAD, VICE PRESDIENT MANZOOR AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOSENZO, ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISOR BETTAUER AND SCIATT, IN CONNECTION WITH NEGOTIATIONS OF NCULEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT, ETEMAD ENGAGED IN TOUR DU'HORIZON ON NON-PROLIFERATION AREA.
- 2. KEY ITEMS DISCUSSED WERE: (A) SOUTH AFRICA: ETEMAD SAID THAT THE HAD HELD TWO DAYS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH ROUX LAST MONTH TO TRY TO CONVINCE ROUX THAT SAG HAS NO CHOICE BUT JOINT NPT IF IT IS TO PREVENT TOTAL ISOLATION, EVEN FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES. WHILE CLEARLY THERE WAS NO GUARANTEE THAT WEST WOULD SUPPORT SAG, PARTICULARLY EC, BEST HOPE FOR SAG WAS TO ADHERE TO NPT. IF SAG HAS NO NUCLEAR WEAPON INTENTIONS, SAG SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE AND PERHPAS SOMETHING TO GAIN, I.E., U.S. SUPPORT AND STRONG EVIDENCE OF PEACEFUL INTENTIONS OF SAG NUCLEAR PROGRAM. ETEMAD SAID THAT HE BELIEVED ROUX WAS FINALLY CONVINCED OF ABOVE LOGIC. ETEMAD SECRET

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WISHED TO KNOAT PROGRESS IF ANY WE WERE ACHIEVEING.
NOSENZO TOLD HIM ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS THAT AMBASSADOR
SMITH'S VISIT TO SA HAD BEEN GENERALLY PRODUCTIVE AND
THAT THERE WAS POSSIBILITY OF SAG ADHERENCE TO NPT AND
ACCEPTANCE OF FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS IN EXCHANGE FOR U.S.
NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND SUPPLY GUARANTEES. (B) PAKISTANC
ETEMAD SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW PAKS FULLY AWARE OF PURPOSE

OF JACOMET MISSION AND WERE IN VERY DIFFICULT POSITION. HE CHARACTERIZED ZIA GOVERNEMENT AS VERY WEAK AND UNABLE TO TAKE REPROCESSING DECISION ON ITS OWN. PAKS WERE PARANOID ABOUT INDIA AND NEEDED TO BE PERSUADED THAT SITUATION HAD CHANGED AND THAT IT SHOULD REASSESS ITS PRIORITIES. HE SAID THAT GOP HAD BOXED THEMSELVES IN BY INFLATING IMPOR-TANCE OF REPROCESSING PLANT. HE ADDED THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT PAKS HAVE FACE-SAVING WAY OUT IF FRENCH DECIDE TO CANCEL. HE ADDED THAT FRENCH WERE UNDER GREAT DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO NOT CANCEL AND TO MEET THEIR COMMITMENT. THE SAME WAS TRUE IN IRAO WITH REGARD TO THE HEW RESEARCH REACTOR AND BOTH TRANSFERS WERE NOT ADDING TO THE STABILIZATION OF THE REGION. U.S. SIDE ANOTED THAT ONE CONCERN OF FRENCH WAS THEIR IMAGE AS RELIABLE SUPPLIER AND THAT WHATEVER MORAL SUPPORT IRAN COULD GEIVE THE FRENCH IN THIS REGARD WOULD BE EHLPFUL. (C) INDIA: U.S. SIDE GAVE HIGHLIGHTS OF SITUATION WITH INDIA VIS-A-VIS TARAPU AND INDIAN ACCEPTANCE OF FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. ETEMAD SAID THAT HE SAW MOVE OF ROMANI TO DEFENSE MINSTRY AND SETHNA TO DELHI AS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT INDA UNDER DESAI GOVERNMENT HAD ABONDONED ANY PLANS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT. HE WELCOMED U.S. EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE INDIA-TO ACCEPT CTB AND FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AS EQUIVALENT NPT COMMIT-MENT: ETEMAD SAID THAT PROC

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VERY EAGER TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM. HE THOUGHT SAFEGUARDS PROBLEM COULD BE WORKED OUT THROUGH FRENCH BILATERAL SAFEGUARDS APPROACH AND COULD BE JUSTIFIED TO INDIA ON BASIS THAT PRC WAS NO MEMBER OF IAEA. HE OFFERED THAT REACTOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND APPLICATION CONTROLS, IF ANY, WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN FROM PRC. BASED ON RECENT CONVERSATIONS OF IRANIAN OFFICIALS WITH PRC, ETEMAD FELT THAT THE PRC WAS NOT PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN JOINING NPT ANYTIME IN NEAR FUTURE SINCE THEY SAW NO PARTICULAR VALUE IN IT AND BECAUSE OF TAIWAN PROBLEM (HE SAID PRC HAD GIVEN INDICATIONS THAT THEY WISHED IAEA SAFEGUARDS TO CONTINUE ON TAIWAN). (E) INFCE: ETEMAD INQUIRED AS TO U.S. VIEW OF

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PROGRESS OF INFCE. NOSENZO SAID THAT WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF WORKING GROUP 3. WHICH HAD BECOME OVERLY POLITICAL, ALL OTHER WORKING GROUPS SEEM TO BE MOVING WELL THROUGH FIRST PHASE OF BASICALLY DATA COLLECTION. SECOND YEAR WOULD BE CRITICAL IN PULLING EXERCISE TOGETHER. U.S. WAS NO EXPECTING MIRACLES. HOWEVER, WE WERE LOOKING TOWARD CONSENSUS BY PARTICIPANTS THAT (1) MOST COUNTRIES DID NOT NEED FULL FUEL CYCLE CAPA-BILITIES AND COULD GET ALONG QUITE WELL WITH SERVICES, AND (2) SENSITIVE FACILITIES REPRESENTED A SIGNIFICANT PROLIFERATION RISK THAT WAS DIFFICULT TO CONTROL WITH AGENCY SAFEGUARDS ALONE. SOLUTION IS TO BUILD SUCH FACI-LITIES TO EXTENT POSSIBLE. AND TO LOCATE NEW FACILITIES IN SAFEST POSSIBLE PLACES. ANY NEW PLANTS SHOULD UTILIZE SAFEST TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE, AND BE MULTINATIONAL, BOTH TO ENSURE ADDITIONAL POLITICAL BARRIERS TO DIVERSION OR ABROGATION AND TO ALLOW GREATER GUARANTEE OF ACCESS TO SERVICES BY PARTICPATING COUNTRIES. WHILE WE COULD ARGUE OVER QUESTION OF WHEN REPROCESSING MAY BE NEEDED ECONOMICALLY, ABOVE PRINCIPLES PROVIDED REASONABLE BASIS FOR HARMONIZING POLICIES AND PROGRAMS OF U.S., EURATOM, IRAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES. ETEMAD SAID HE FULLY AGREED SECRET

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AND FELT MOST COUNTRIES WOULD GO ALONG WITH THE CONCEPT, PROVIDED THAT ACCESS TO SERVICES WAS AVAILABLE WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THIS WAS A REALISTIC AND ACHIEVABLE OUTCOME OF INFCE AND HE PERSONALLY COULD SUPPORT THIS POSITION. (F) FUEL BANK: IN RESPONSE TO ETEMAD'S QUERY CONCERNING WHAT MIGHT BE DONE WITH WORKING GROUP 3, U.S. SIDE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED CONCEPT OF FUEL BANK IN CONTEXT OF PROVIDING

GUARANTEES OF FRONT END SUPPLY YO VENCOURAGE COUNTRIES NOT TO DEVELOP INDIGENOUS ENRICHMENT AND PREPROCESSING, AND NOTED THAT CURRENT U.S. IDEA WAS FOR A SMALL BANK. ETEMAD SAID THAT THIS MADE THE MOST SENSE TO HIM AND THAT LARGE BANK WAS UNNECESSARY TO GUARANTEE FUEL SUPPLY IN HOPEFULLY ISOLATED AND SHORT TERM SITUATIONS. NAAS

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ISLAMABAD MULTIPLE

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